- British luxury is worth GBP 81 billion to the UK economy, supports nearly 500,000 skilled jobs and generates GBP 56 billion in exports, according to Walpole.
- Burberry and Mulberry are both increasing domestic production, in Yorkshire and Somerset respectively.
- Mulberry is explicitly shifting marketing budget out of Asia-Pacific and back into the UK and United States.
- Made in Britain is being repositioned from a label into a supply chain decision with brand consequences.
British luxury has quietly changed strategy. After a decade in which the sector’s growth plan was Asia-Pacific expansion, its two most recognisable names are now investing in domestic manufacturing and redirecting marketing spend home. Burberry is increasing production in Yorkshire, Mulberry in Somerset, and Mulberry’s chief executive Andrea Baldo has been explicit that the group is scaling back in China and moving budget into the UK and United States. The sector is worth GBP 81 billion to the British economy and supports nearly 500,000 skilled jobs. What is happening is not nostalgia. It is a bet that provenance is easier to defend than scale. Here is the reasoning.
The Numbers Behind the Sector
Walpole, the body representing British luxury, put the figures on the record at its annual summit. Chief executive Helen Brocklebank framed the sector not as a victim of volatility but as one of those best placed to shape what comes next.
- GBP 81 billion contributed to the UK economy.
- Nearly 500,000 skilled, well-paid jobs supported.
- GBP 56 billion in exports.
Separately, the UK luxury goods market was valued at USD 19.25 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach USD 28.56 billion by 2032, a compound rate of around 5%. Those two sets of numbers measure different things: the first is what British luxury produces, the second is what Britain consumes. The gap between them is the export business, and it is the larger half.
GBP 56 billion of GBP 81 billion. Exports account for roughly two thirds of what British luxury generates. This is a manufacturing and export sector that happens to have shops, which is a different business from a retail sector that happens to make things.
Why Reshore Production Now?
Three reasons, and only one of them is about cost.
Provenance is the only defensible claim left. When every house in the category is telling a craft story, the ones that can point to an actual factory in an actual county have an argument the others do not. Made in Britain is verifiable in a way that heritage-inspired is not, and verifiability is what separates a code from a marketing line, as we set out in heritage brand strategy.
Shorter supply chains respond faster. Domestic production allows agile inventory and quicker reaction to demand, which matters in a market where the aspirational customer has become unpredictable and over-ordering is expensive.
Tariffs made distance a liability. A supply chain routed through several jurisdictions is exposed to every trade decision taken in any of them. Manufacturing close to a major market removes a variable that turned out to matter far more than anyone modelled in 2019.
Mulberry Is the Clearest Case
Andrea Baldo, who took the chief executive role in September, has described a strategy of winning back British customers, building digital in the United States and scaling back in China, closing non-performing stores there and moving marketing budgets from Asia-Pacific into the UK and US.
His framing of the brand is worth quoting for what it concedes: luxury for Mulberry means luxury at the entry price. That is an unusually direct statement of position, and it explains the rest of the strategy. A house at the entry point of luxury cannot outspend the majors on awareness in China. It can own a specific national identity at a specific price, and that is a defensible corner.
The context is difficult. Mulberry reported a 27.9% drop in Asia-Pacific sales in the 13 weeks to 28 December, with revenue down 18.3% overall even as Europe and the US grew 11.1%, and it is working to reduce operating costs by around 25% annualised against 2024.
Read those two numbers together and the strategy is not a choice, it is arithmetic. Asia-Pacific fell 27.9% while Europe and America grew 11.1%. Moving the budget follows the demand.
Made in Britain is a claim with legal weight rather than a marketing phrase. Country-of-origin labelling in the UK generally requires that the last substantial transformation of the product took place there, which means a bag assembled in Somerset from imported leather can carry it while one finished abroad from British leather cannot. That distinction matters commercially, because it determines which houses can make the claim at all and therefore how much competitive value it retains.
The Shift From Aspirational to VIC
Underneath the manufacturing story sits a broader repositioning. British brands have been pivoting away from aspirational shoppers, who were hit hardest by the cost-of-living squeeze, and toward very important clients.
That is the same movement visible across the sector, and it carries the same risk everywhere. A narrower client base at a higher spend produces the same revenue with fewer relationships, which is stable while those clients stay and fragile when they do not. It also removes the recruitment layer: the aspirational buyer at twenty-five is the VIC at forty-five, and a house that stops serving the first eventually runs out of the second.
Burberry’s own recovery has been built on what its chief executive Joshua Schulman calls a more get-able take on British luxury, which is an attempt to hold both ends rather than abandon one. The house had sales down 15% year on year in the twelve months to March 2025 before the turnaround took hold.
Reshoring is a positioning decision dressed as an operations decision. A factory in Yorkshire costs more than a factory elsewhere, and what it buys is a claim nobody can copy and a supply chain nobody can tariff into unprofitability. For a sector exporting two thirds of what it makes, that is the more durable asset.
Bottom Line
British luxury generates GBP 81 billion for the UK economy, exports GBP 56 billion of it and supports nearly half a million skilled jobs, and its two best-known houses are responding to a difficult market by investing at home rather than abroad. Burberry in Yorkshire, Mulberry in Somerset, both shifting attention from Asia-Pacific back to the UK and United States after Mulberry watched Asian sales fall 27.9% while Europe and America grew 11.1%. The bet is that verifiable provenance holds its value better than geographic reach, and it is a reasonable one in a category where every competitor claims craft and few can point to the building. The risk is the parallel move toward VIC clients, which narrows the base that produces tomorrow’s buyers. The pricing discipline underneath sits in luxury brand management, and the wider category divergence in LVMH’s return to growth.
FAQ
How big is the British luxury sector?
According to Walpole, it contributes GBP 81 billion to the UK economy, supports nearly 500,000 skilled jobs and generates GBP 56 billion in exports. Separately, the UK luxury goods market, meaning domestic consumption rather than production, was valued at USD 19.25 billion in 2024 with projections of USD 28.56 billion by 2032.
Why are British brands moving production back to the UK?
Three reasons: provenance is a verifiable claim that competitors cannot easily copy, shorter supply chains allow faster response to demand, and manufacturing close to major markets reduces exposure to trade and tariff decisions. Cost is not among them, since domestic production is generally more expensive.
What does made in Britain legally require?
Country-of-origin rules generally turn on where the last substantial transformation of the product occurred. A bag assembled in Britain from imported materials can typically carry the claim, while one finished abroad from British materials cannot. That determines which houses can use it, and therefore how much the claim is worth.
Is focusing on VIC clients a good strategy?
It stabilises revenue in the short term by concentrating on the customers least affected by economic pressure. The longer-term risk is that it removes the recruitment layer, since today’s aspirational buyer is tomorrow’s major client. Houses that abandon the entry point entirely tend to find their top-tier base ageing without replacement.
